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WHERE TO POINT THE FINGER: 
OMNICARE’S ATTEMPT TO RECTIFY THE 
COLLECTIVE SCIENTER DEBATE 
Abstract: The crucial element in pleading a securities fraud case under the 
1934 Exchange Act is proving that the defendant had the requisite intent, or 
scienter. Circuit courts are divided over the issue of pleading scienter against a 
corporation for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 securities fraud cases. Since a 
corporation can only act through its agents, courts have struggled to determine 
which agents’ mental states can be imputed against a corporation. In 2014, in 
In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit created a new rule to address pleading scienter against a corpora-
tion in securities fraud cases. This rule incorporates positions from both sides 
of the scienter debate, and is likely an appealing approach for those circuits 
that have not fully ruled against either side of the split. This Note discusses 
the corporate scienter debate, and argues that the Sixth Circuit’s Omnicare rul-
ing must be further refined in order to establish a conclusive and widely appli-
cable pleading standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three years, an overwhelming majority of securities fraud 
class action claims have alleged section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations.1 
Financial scandals result in lawsuits brought by true victims and opportunis-
tic plaintiffs alike.2 To distinguish meritorious and frivolous suits, Congress 
established the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) in 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 
8 (2015) (illustrating that Rule 10b-5 claims account for nearly 85% of all securities claims in the 
last three years). Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 make it illegal to employ any type of manipulative 
device or fraudulent scheme in connection with the purchase or sale of any registered security. See 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). In 2013 alone, securities class action 
settlements totaled $4.77 billion. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENTS: 2013 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 3 (2014). 
 2 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730 (describing evidence of plaintiffs suing frivolously in order to collect settlements from 
deep-pocketed defendants); see also Allan Horwich & Sean Siekkinen, Pleading Reform or Un-
constitutional Encroachment? An Analysis of the Seventh Amendment Implications of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 35 SEC. REG. L.J. 4, 4 (2006) (discussing the overly vague plead-
ing standard for securities fraud cases and the effect it has on both valid and meritless plaintiffs); 
David S. Ruder et al., The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Pre- and Post-Enron Responses 
to Corporate Financial Fraud: An Analysis and Evaluation, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1103, 
1106–07 (2005) (describing some of the most notorious major financial scandals at the turn of the 
century). 
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1995, which heightened the pleading requirements in securities fraud cas-
es.3 Unfortunately, Congress failed to define explicitly the requirements for 
pleading a defendant’s mental state, otherwise known as scienter.4  
Although the concept of scienter is well established, the circumstances 
in which it is imputed to a corporation is unsettled.5 The federal circuits are 
split on the applicability of a theory known as collective scienter to the 
pleading standards of securities fraud cases.6 Collective scienter attaches 
corporate liability by aggregating the mental states of numerous agents 
within a corporation, regardless of whether those employees had any role in 
the alleged fraud. 7  Numerous circuits have rejected collective scienter, 
looking no further than the state of mind of the corporate officials who 
make or issue alleged fraudulent statements to analyze scienter.8 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012); Bruce Cannon Gibney, Comment, The End of the 
Unbearable Lightness of Pleading: Scienter After Silicon Graphics, 48 UCLA L. REV. 973, 973 
(2001) (“One of [Congress’s] primary weapons to combat strike suits was to heighten the mens 
rea pleading requirement for securities fraud.”). 
 4 See Horwich & Siekkinen, supra note 2, at 4 (“The PSLRA’s language is problematically 
vague, which has led to several circuit splits . . . most significantly the extent to which the PSLRA 
requires securities fraud plaintiffs to aver detailed facts supporting the rule 10b-5 cause of action 
element of scienter.”); Gibney, supra note 3, at 977 (discussing the split amongst circuits regard-
ing scienter pleading requirements for securities fraud); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976) (defining scienter as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud”). Compare In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Omnicare II), 769 F.3d 455, 
476–77 (6th Cir. 2014) (implementing a ruling, in part, to encourage public accountability of large 
corporate defendants), with Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 
2004) (relying on the plain meaning of the statutory language and congressional intent to infer 
pleading requirements).  
 5 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 473. 
 6 See Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC Enforcement Actions, 
6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2009) (describing the emergence of collective scienter and its ac-
ceptance and rejection in various federal circuits). Compare Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. 
Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding it is possible 
for a plaintiff to plead a strong inference of scienter without focusing on a single expressly named 
officer), and In re Maxwell Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1032 (S.D. Cal. 2014) 
(holding that this case was not an appropriate circumstance for plaintiffs to plead collective scien-
ter), with Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(concluding that collective scienter or group pleading was inapplicable). 
 7 Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 81, 86; Kevin M. O’Riordan, Note, Clear Support or Cause for Suspicion? A Cri-
tique of Collective Scienter in Securities Litigation, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1596, 1605 (2007) (explain-
ing that through collective scienter, the fraudulent act and scienter of the corporation can exist in 
two completely independent employees); see also Heather F. Crow, Comment, Riding the Fence 
on Collective Scienter: Allowing Plaintiffs to Clear the PSLRA Pleading Hurdle, 71 LA. L. REV. 
313, 314 (2010) (illustrating corporate liability through collective scienter by presenting a hypo-
thetical in which a corporate officer makes a public statement about positive clinical trials regard-
ing a new drug, while at the same time a company scientist discovers negative side effects to the 
drug but remains silent).  
 8 See Southland, 365 F.3d at 366 (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to establish collective scienter); 
Warren R. Stern & Geoffrey A. Starks, Defining Corporate Scienter, SEC. LITIG. REP., Sept. 2006, 
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Recently, in 2014 in In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Om-
nicare II”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit set forth a new 
approach to corporate scienter. 9 Combining the theories of several other 
circuits, the Sixth Circuit laid out a hybrid collective scienter rule in order 
to rectify the ideological flaws in each circuit’s stance.10 The Sixth Circuit’s 
new theory of corporate scienter liability has established a “middle-ground” 
in the collective scienter debate, and made the issue ripe for U.S. Supreme 
Court review.11  
This Note argues that the Omnicare II ruling, with a small change, 
should serve as the prevailing standard for corporate scienter.12 Part I pro-
vides an overview of corporate scienter and the competing scholarly stances 
on the issue.13 Part II discusses both the traditional and somewhat unclear 
positions on collective scienter adopted throughout the federal circuits.14 
Part III examines the Sixth Circuit’s position on corporate scienter leading 
up to Omnicare II, and how the court’s new approach relates to other cir-
cuits.15 Finally, Part IV argues that the Omnicare standard is ideal for unde-
cided circuits, but the term “high managerial agent” in its standard must be 
further defined in order to avoid ambiguities in securities fraud pleading.16 
I. PLEADING SCIENTER AND ITS COMPETING THEORIES 
An enduring tension between accountability and legitimacy in federal 
securities claims underlies the various scienter approaches among the feder-
                                                                                                                           
at 21 (describing Southland’s conformity with narrower common law principles); see also Mat-
thew Aglialoro, Note, The New Group Pleading Doctrine, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 464 (2014) 
(discussing the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of the group pleading doctrine). 
9 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (establishing an approach that clarifies the Sixth Circuit’s 
previous position and addresses issues from other circuits).  
 10 See ROBERT J. HAFT ET AL., LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS & ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES 
TRANSACTIONS, § 3:15.50, Westlaw (database updated May 2015) (discussing Omnicare II’s attempt 
to reconcile various approaches adopted throughout the circuits); see also Robert Anello, Corporate 
State of Mind in Securities Cases: The Sixth Circuit Blazes a New Trail, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014, 3:10 
PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20150915061356/http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2014/10/15/
corporate-state-of-mind-in-securities-cases-the-sixth-circuit-blazes-a-new-trail/. 
11 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (“Given that neither [collective scienter] approach is ide-
al, a middle ground is necessary.”); David V. McCaughey & Gregory L. Demers, Revisiting Cor-
porate Scienter: In Search of a Middle Ground, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 858 
(Apr. 27, 2015) (speculating that it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court weighs in on 
the collective scienter debate).  
 12 See infra notes 181–228 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–83 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 87–123 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 128–175 and accompanying text.  
 16 See infra notes 181–228 and accompanying text. 
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al circuits.17 This Part provides a historical overview of securities fraud and 
section 10(b) jurisprudence, and the competing approaches of collective 
scienter resulting therefrom.18 Section A discusses both the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act, explaining the role of each statute in the perceived need 
for pleading collective scienter.19 Section B analyzes the competing stances 
on collective scienter, and the corresponding deficiencies that courts and 
scholars have identified.20  
A. The Exchange Act and Pleading Under the PSLRA 
Congress enacted the Exchange Act to ensure full disclosure by public-
ly traded corporations and to provide investors with complete and accurate 
information about potential investments.21 Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act broadly declares it unlawful to engage in any deceptive or manipulative 
conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.22 Pursuant to 
authority granted by the Exchange Act, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”) created Rule 10b-5, which makes employment of manipu-
lative devices or fraudulent practices illegal. 23 Specifically, the rule polices 
false statements or omissions of material fact that serve to mislead the pub-
lic in the purchase and sale of securities.24 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Gibney, supra note 3, at 975–77 (describing how the lack of clarity in the PSLRA has 
led to disagreement among the federal circuits); Ryan Lee Hart, Comment, Deterrence and Fair-
ness: Why the Current Financial Crisis Demands a Product-Oriented Relaxation of the PSLRA, 5 
SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 411, 413 (2011) (contrasting the deterrent nature of securities class 
actions with the challenges of pleading under the PSLRA).  
 18 See infra notes 21–83 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 21–44 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 45–83 and accompanying text. 
 21 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2012); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 
186 (1963) (noting that the underlying function of the Exchange Act was “to substitute a philoso-
phy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”). Along with other fundamental securi-
ties legislation, the Exchange Act was enacted in response to the 1929 stock market crash and the 
ensuing Great Depression. See Browning Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in 
Jurisdictions Rejecting Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 497–98 (2013) (giving 
historical context for the Exchange Act and other major 1930s securities legislation). 
 22 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe . . . .”). Although 
section 10(b) covers many different types of securities violations, this Note focuses on fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
 23 See 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (establishing an administrative prohibition relating to manipula-
tive securities practices); Jeffries, supra note 21, at 498 (highlighting Rule 10b-5). 
 24 See 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (b) 
[t]o make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading . . . .”). 
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Both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 implicitly grant private litigants the 
power to pursue claims under those provisions.25 To plead a valid Rule 10b-
5 claim, a private litigant must prove a number of elements.26 First, a plain-
tiff must establish that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or 
omission.27 Second, a plaintiff must establish scienter and a connection be-
tween the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a secu-
rity.28 Next, a plaintiff must prove reliance upon the misrepresentation or 
omission and economic loss.29 Finally, a successful plaintiff must establish 
loss causation.30 
Scienter is “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”31 When the SEC or private plaintiffs allege a corporation commit-
ted securities fraud, proving scienter is often the toughest challenge.32 A 
corporation cannot operate on its own, but acts solely through its agents.33 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12–13 & n.9 (1971); see 
also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (“Of 
course, a private plaintiff now may bring suit against violators of § 10(b).”). 
26 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (de-
scribing the elements of a 10(b) action); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Boudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) 
(laying out the elements for private litigants in securities actions against publicly traded compa-
nies). 
27 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157. A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that its dis-
closure would have been considered significant by a reasonable investor. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).  
28 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157; see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193–94 & n.12 (holding 
that a private cause of action under section 10(b) will not survive without pleading scienter). See 
generally Thomas J. Molony, Beyond the Target Market: Product Advertising and Rule 10b-5’s 
“in Connection with” Requirement, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101, 108–12 (2013) (providing an over-
view of the jurisprudence regarding the “in connection with” requirement).  
29 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157. Reliance can be established through the “fraud on the market 
theory,” which presumes that well-developed markets reflect all publicly-available information 
including material misrepresentations. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231 (explaining the rationale 
behind the reliance presumption). 
 30 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (detailing the plaintiff’s burden to prove loss causation); Dura 
Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341–42. 
 31 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193–94 n.12; see Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 472; In re Digi Int’l, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 14 F. App’x 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Ann M. Lipton, Slouching Towards 
Monell: The Disappearance of Vicarious Liability Under Section 10(b), 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1261, 1263 (2015) (defining scienter). 
 32 See Crow, supra note 7, at 325 (highlighting scienter as one of the most challenging hur-
dles for plaintiffs in securities fraud cases); Gibney, supra note 3, at 976 (“Because scienter is 
often the hardest element to plead in securities cases, section 21D(b)(2) takes on enormous signif-
icance for defendants seeking to dismiss claims.”); see also Paul B. Maslo, The Case for Semi-
Strong-Form Corporate Scienter in Securities Fraud Actions, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
95, 95 (2010), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=mlr_fi [https://
perma.cc/L9DM-3B2P] (explaining that a corporation does not have a unified mind). 
 33 Bondi, supra note 6, at 2–3 (discussing the challenges of establishing scienter against a 
corporation); see also Yedidia Z. Stern, Corporate Criminal Liability—Who Is the Corporation?, 
13 J. CORP. L. 125, 125 (1987) (explaining that a corporation can only act through its agents); 
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Determining which agent’s scienter is imputed to the corporation, however, 
is problematic.34  
After many years of what Congress viewed as abuse of securities laws 
by private litigants, Congress enacted the PSLRA in order to impose 
heightened pleading standards.35 With regard to scienter, the PSLRA re-
quires that a plaintiff plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that a defendant acted with the required state of mind.36 A crucial 
distinction of the pre-PSLRA pleading standard is that a plaintiff only need-
ed to plead with particularity regarding the fraudulent act, but could plead 
generally to the state of mind of the individual committing the fraud.37 
What constituted a “strong inference” was the subject of debate for the 
next decade until the U.S. Supreme Court settled the issue in 2007, in Tell-
                                                                                                                           
Aglialoro, supra note 8, at 557–58 (noting the problems for plaintiffs trying to identify the proper 
agent in a pleading against a corporation).  
 34 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 473; Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capi-
tal and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 959 (2013) (noting how 
corporate scienter has never been effectively established despite many years of jurisprudence); see 
also McCaughey & Demers, supra note 11, at 858 (detailing the issues with deciphering corporate 
mens rea). 
 35 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41. 
 36 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). The law states,  
[I]n any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover 
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of 
mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this 
chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind. 
Id. Prior to the PSLRA, plaintiffs had to meet the normal fraud pleading standards of Rule 9(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to survive a motion to dismiss. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); 
Jeffries, supra note 21, at 521. 
 37 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions 
of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”); see also Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 472–73 (“In 
run-of-the-mill fraud causes, [plaintiff] could allege this mental state ‘generally,’ but in securities 
fraud actions, Congress has imposed a higher standard, requiring plaintiffs to ‘state with particu-
larity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b))). Post-PSLRA, a plaintiff must 
plead particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, or the court will grant the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Jeffries, supra note 21, at 523. The PSLRA addresses abuses 
caused by meritless cases brought for the purposes of forcing large settlements, which result in 
exorbitant costs to investors and corporations. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32; see Stoneridge, 522 
U.S. 148 at 163–64 (describing instances of meritless lawsuits being filed in the hope of extorting 
large settlements). The legislative history noted that of approximately 300 securities lawsuits filed 
each year, almost 93% settled for an average cost of $8.6 million. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 9 (1995), 
as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688. These settlements were often not based on the merits 
of the case, but rather on corporations’ deep pockets. Id. The PSLRA addresses this issue by im-
posing a number of changes in rules regarding discovery, lead plaintiffs, proportionate liability, 
and most importantly, a heightened pleading requirement for securities litigation. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-369, at 32; Crow, supra note 7, at 319. 
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abs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (“Tellabs I”).38 The Court held that 
a plaintiff must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as like-
ly as any plausible opposing inference.39 Only at trial must a plaintiff prove 
that the defendant more likely than not acted with scienter.40 Although Tell-
abs I clarified the proper pleading standard for scienter under the PSLRA, it 
left the issue of imputation to a defendant corporation unresolved.41 
The heightened pleading requirements for securities fraud actions un-
derscores the continuing tension between preventing meritless “strike suits” 
under the PSLRA and maintaining corporate accountability under the Ex-
change Act.42 For plaintiffs, the difficulty lies in proving both the identity 
and requisite mental state of guilty actors that exist within vast corporate 
organizations. 43  Even with strong circumstantial evidence of corporate 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs I), 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (de-
fining “strong inference” in light of the PSLRA’s goals); see also Jeffries, supra note 21, at 522–
23. In “Tellabs I”, the U.S. Supreme Court established a three-part test for assessing the sufficien-
cy of a plaintiff’s scienter allegations. See 551 U.S. at 322–24. First, as with a typical motion to 
dismiss, the court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true. Id. at 322. Second, 
courts must analyze all allegations in the complaint to determine if, taken together, a strong infer-
ence of scienter is asserted. Id. at 322–23. Finally, in concluding whether the facts plead the requi-
site strong inference of scienter, the court must account for all possible opposing inferences. Id. at 
323. The court will allow the complaint to go forward “only if a reasonable person would deem 
the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference.” Id. at 324. 
 39 Tellabs I, 551 U.S. at 328; see also 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.8[4][B] (4th ed. 2002), (asserting that the Tellabs standard strikes 
the right balance between plaintiff and defendant interests). 
 40 Tellabs I, 551 U.S. at 328–29; see also Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: 
A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1493 (2010) (discussing the Tellabs I 
standard). The burden of proof in section 10(b) securities fraud cases is a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 375 (1983). Preponderance 
of the evidence requires evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the 
issue rather than the other. See Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 41 Tellabs I, 551 U.S. at 326 n.6 (“The Seventh Circuit held that allegations of scienter made 
against one defendant cannot be imputed to all other individual defendants . . . . Though there is a 
disagreement among the circuits as to whether the group pleading doctrine survived the PSLRA 
. . . we do not disturb it.”).  
 42 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (arguing that the private securities litigation system’s 
importance to the integrity of American markets speaks to the need to limit frivolous suits); Mas-
lo, supra note 32, at 97 (discussing how narrow scienter standards prevent strike suits but allow 
corporations to evade liability); Crow, supra note 7, at 317 (noting the clear tension between the 
need to prevent wasteful claims and protect shareholders from fraud). 
 43 Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 107 (detailing the evidentiary obstacles of pleading facts 
regarding a single individual within a large corporation); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Agency 
Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1213–
14 (2003) (discussing the difficulty in attributing an agent’s knowledge to a corporation principal); 
Aglialoro, supra note 8, at 458 (recognizing the problem with needing to identify a responsible 
agent when pleading all security fraud elements with particularity). 
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fraud, it is incredibly difficult to locate a single guilty agent or group within 
a corporation.44  
B. Competing Positions on Corporate Scienter 
Responding to the challenge of identifying an imputable mental state 
to a corporation, courts and scholars have developed competing theories on 
corporate scienter.45 Virtually all courts agree that scienter can be imputed 
to a corporate defendant if a plaintiff pleads facts that an authorized agent 
made a fraudulent statement with the requisite intent or knowledge. 46 
Where circuits diverge is on the issue of whether a corporation can be held 
liable when the person connected to the misstatement did not know the truth 
but others did, or where no single employee knows the truth but the collec-
tive knowledge of several would expose the truth.47 Scholars have divided 
courts into three factions with respect to collective scienter: those that com-
pletely reject it, those that apply strong collective scienter, and others that 
apply weak or hybrid versions of the doctrine.48 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 107; see also Lipton, supra note 31, at 1269–70 (high-
lighting how vicarious liability becomes difficult in the context of large corporations); Ethan D. 
Wohl, When Does a Company Intend to Lie?, 21 ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP. 3, 4 (2007) 
(illustrating the problems of corporate attribution even in the face of clear fraud).  
 45 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 473 (highlighting the disagreement among circuit courts and 
scholars regarding imputing corporate scienter); Maslo, supra note 32, at 95 (explaining how the 
complexities of pleading against a corporation have led to different theories of corporate scienter); 
O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1598–99 (explaining how a corporation’s unique legal status compli-
cates corporate liability and causes disagreement among courts). 
 46 See, e.g., Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (concluding that the state of mind of the individual 
who uttered or issued the misrepresentation is relevant for purposes of imputing scienter); Glazer 
Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring a party to plead in 
detail with respect to the individuals who actually made the false statements); Teamsters, 531 F.3d 
at 195 (“[T]he most straightforward way to raise such an inference for a corporate defendant will 
be to plead it for an individual defendant.”). 
 47 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining the foundations of collective and corporate scien-
ter); O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1605 (describing corporate scienter). Compare Southland, 365 
F.3d at 365 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., No. 4:00-CV-355-Y, 
2002 WL 32453742, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Southland, 365 
F.3d 353) (requiring plaintiffs “to enlighten each defendant as to his or her particular part in the 
alleged fraud”), with City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 688 
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the knowledge of corporate officers or agents who are acting with 
authority can be attributed to the corporation). 
 48 Bondi, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining the varying approaches courts take regarding collec-
tive scienter); see also Jeffries, supra note 21, at 524–25 (introducing the various lines of cases 
regarding collective scienter); Maslo, supra note 32, at 95–96 (describing theories of corporate 
scienter). Some circuits have not fully committed to one of these categories, which may be in part 
due to the inherent shortcomings of each approach. See Glazer, 549 F.3d at 744–45 (holding that 
plaintiffs must plead scienter for each individual, but in certain circumstances some form of col-
lective scienter might be appropriate); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs II), 
513 F.3d 702, 708, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that Rule 10b-5 requires courts to consider the 
scienter of individuals who make false statements, but noting that a strong inference of scienter 
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1. Traditional Scienter: Rejecting the Collective Approach 
Circuits rejecting the theory of collective scienter follow a traditional 
approach that requires proof that the individual responsible for the mis-
statement had the requisite intent or knowledge in order to impute scienter 
to the corporation.49 This theory stems from the common law agency prin-
ciple of respondeat superior.50 Respondeat superior creates employer liabil-
ity for the actions of employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment.51 This liability, however, is limited to and cannot exceed that of the 
culpable employee or agent.52  
Because a corporation acts only through its agents, supporters of this 
traditional theory require that scienter be pleaded to at least one authorized 
agent involved in the fraudulent conduct.53 The necessary scienter required 
to form fraudulent intent cannot be imputed to a corporation based on dis-
connected facts known by various agents.54 The most common policy justi-
fications for traditional scienter is that it best serves the PSLRA’s goals of 
curbing harmful, meritless litigation and encouraging corporate disclo-
sure.55 
                                                                                                                           
may exist without naming the specific individuals who engaged in the fraud); Teamsters, 531 F.3d 
at 195 (arguably adopting a broader approach to pleading scienter but maintaining a traditional 
individual approach in proving liability). 
 49 Bondi, supra note 6, at 8; see Phillips, 374 F.3d at 1017–18 (holding that scienter must be 
found with respect to each defendant and each violation of the statute); Southland, 365 F.3d at 366 
(noting that Rule 10b-5 requires courts to consider the state of mind of the individual who makes a 
false statement, rather than consider the collective knowledge of all of the corporation’s officers 
and employees). 
 50 Bondi, supra note 6, at 5; see also Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 97 n.54 (describing a 
spectrum of approaches to scienter, with pleading collective knowledge on one end and the use of 
respondeat superior on the other); Lipton, supra note 31, at 1264 (noting that mens rea has been 
traditionally imputed to corporations via respondeat superior). Agency is the fiduciary relationship 
that is created when the employer and employee (the agent) mutually agree that the employee will 
act on behalf of the employer, subject to the employer’s control. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (“[A]n employer is subject to liability for torts 
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”). 
 52 Crow, supra note 7, at 323; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. d(2) 
(“[A] principal may not be subject to liability for fraud if one agent makes a statement, believing it 
to be true, while another agent knows facts that falsify the other agent’s statement.”). 
 53 See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 184 (4th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that 
a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter regarding at least one agent 
because a corporation’s liability comes from its agents); Southland, 365 F.3d at 365 (requiring that 
plaintiffs enlighten each defendant as to his or her role in the fraud). 
 54 Gutter v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (rejecting 
the notion that scienter can be imputed from different agents within the corporation); see also 
O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1619 (summarizing the Gutter holding). 
 55 See Jeffries, supra note 21, at 525–26 (discussing the position of circuits that have rejected 
collective scienter); Randall W. Bodner et al., Corporate Scienter After Janus, 44 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1639 (Sept. 3, 2012) (arguing for the prudence and balance of a traditional 
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Scholars criticize the respondeat superior approach to scienter for a 
number of reasons.56 They argue that, even for valid claims, it is incredibly 
difficult to find both action and scienter for a single agent in the vast, com-
plex structures of large publicly-traded corporations.57 Moreover, the lim-
ited scope of respondeat superior could allow a defendant corporation 
whose corporate policies foster a culture of illegal behavior to escape liabil-
ity if there is no identifiable single actor.58 Taken to its logical extreme, cor-
porations could theoretically avoid imputation by intentionally limiting the 
knowledge of different departments while ensuring that those making public 
statements are completely ignorant as to the validity of such statements.59 
Such “see no evil, hear no evil” policies make it difficult for plaintiffs to 
trace the requisite intent to the single agent responsible for the misrepresen-
tation.60 
                                                                                                                           
respondeat superior approach to scienter); O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1613–14 (illustrating how a 
lack of specificity in applying collective scienter runs counter to the PSLRA’s goals). 
 56 Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 112 (explaining how respondeat superior is both under-
inclusive and over-inclusive); see also Maslo, supra note 32, at 97 (arguing that respondeat supe-
rior allows corporations to easily evade liability). 
 57 See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 107 (highlighting the challenges of pleading against 
a large corporation); supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (noting the legal and practical 
issues of pleading securities fraud against a corporation). 
 58 See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 113–14 (identifying a situation where corporate 
culture results in illegal behavior but there is no single identifiable actor with the necessary mental 
state); Lipton, supra note 31, at 1264 (noting a disaggregation between the employee who actually 
made the misrepresentation and the employee with the requisite scienter). 
 59 See Craig L. Griffin, Note, Corporate Scienter Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
1989 BYU L. REV. 1227, 1244 (“A requirement that corporate knowledge exists in a single indi-
vidual would allow a corporation to engage freely in conscious ignorance by keeping lines of 
communication between departments closed.” (emphasis added)); Maslo, supra note 32, at 97 
(arguing that under the respondeat superior approach to scienter, companies could intentionally 
mislead investors and shield culpable actors). 
 60 Lipton, supra note 31, at 1291 (arguing that corporate misconduct is often a result of tacit 
incentives to lower-level employees to shield higher management from liability); Wohl, supra 
note 44, at 3 (explaining that scienter is easily concealed in a company that limits oversight and 
compartmentalizes information with “a policy of see no evil, hear no evil”). Nevertheless, propo-
nents of traditional scienter have theorized that both judges and juries carry certain biases and 
inferences regarding corporations, and are quick to assume willful blindness or corporate malfea-
sance when it may not necessarily be the case. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A 
Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social 
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 158 n.199 (1997) (theorizing that hindsight bias of judges and 
juries could lead to excessive enforcement against corporate defendants). 
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2. Strong Collective Scienter 
Strong collective scienter allows plaintiffs to aggregate the overall col-
lective knowledge of all employees in the corporation.61 Although no courts 
have expressly adopted complete collective scienter, a few have opened the 
door for its use.62 Some courts have held that certain circumstances make it 
reasonable to suggest that management possessed knowledge of a matter 
regardless of pleading individual scienter.63 In such situations, the corpora-
tion itself is viewed as possessing scienter separate from its employees, 
without analyzing the mental state of individual agents.64 Some courts have 
allowed an inference that high-ranking corporate officers have knowledge 
of the “critical core operations” of the company, which can be used in part 
to establish scienter.65 These practices illustrate a shift away from the tradi-
tional agency-based scienter approach to a more flexible standard.66 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1063 (9th Cir. 2014) (identifying the 
general principle of collective scienter); see also Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 86 (introduc-
ing collective scienter); Bondi, supra note 6, at 7 (defining collective scienter).  
 62 See Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 195 (noting the possibility of pleading requisite corporate scien-
ter without regard to a specific defendant); Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710 (“[I]t is possible to draw a 
strong inference without being able to name the individuals who concocted and disseminated the 
fraud.”). 
 63 S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[S]uch allegations may 
conceivably satisfy the PSLRA standard in a more bare form, without accompanying particular-
ized allegations, in rare circumstances where the nature of the relevant fact is of such prominence 
that it would be ‘absurd’ to suggest that management was without knowledge of the matter.”); 
Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that man-
agement had knowledge of certain facts due to the importance of the facts). 
 64 See Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 195 (concluding that it is possible to plead scienter against a 
corporation without pleading facts to a specific individual defendant); Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710 
(stating that it is possible to draw a strong inference of corporate scienter without being able to 
name individuals directly involved in the fraud); see also O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1603 (dif-
ferentiating between a nominalist school, which views a corporation as a group of people with a 
common goal, from the realist school, which posits that a corporation has a culture separate from 
its individual employees). 
 65 See Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 569 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It may also be reasonable to 
conclude that high-ranking corporate officers have knowledge of the critical core operations of 
their companies.”); S. Ferry, 542 F.3d at 784 (“Allegations that rely on the core-operations infer-
ence are among the allegations that may be considered in the complete PSLRA analysis.”). Similar 
allegations under the core-operations inference can satisfy the PSLRA if the allegations are partic-
ular and indicate that the “defendants had actual access to the disputed information.” S. Ferry, 542 
F.3d at 786. 
 66 See Glazer, 549 F.3d at 744–45 (backtracking on the Ninth Circuit’s position by noting that 
the court had not altogether rejected collective scienter); Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 195 (explaining 
that “it is possible to raise the required inference with regard to a corporate defendant without 
doing so with regard to a specific individual defendant”). 
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Opponents to the strong collective scienter theory maintain three cen-
tral objections.67 First, collective scienter is argued to be a slippery slope 
that dangerously overextends corporate liability. 68  Hypothetically, if the 
scienter of any agent can be collectively imputed to the corporation, then a 
company could be liable for any statements regarding its business as long as 
a low-level employee anywhere in the world knew something to the contra-
ry.69 
Second, opponents assert that strong collective scienter goes against 
congressional intent in drafting the PSLRA because it imposes a negligence 
standard on corporate defendants.70 Requiring corporations to be responsi-
ble for the collective knowledge of every employee imposes a duty of in-
quiry that would not satisfy Rule 10b-5 claims.71 At the very minimum, 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Crow, supra note 7, at 327–28 (explaining scholars’ reasoning for rejecting collective 
scienter); O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1614 (arguing that collective scienter opens the door to 
frivolous suits and goes against Congress’s intentions in enacting the PSLRA). 
 68 Brief for Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-
Appellants at 3, Teamsters, 531 F.3d 190 (No. 06-2902-CV) [hereinafter Teamsters Amici Curi-
ae]; see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (holding that the PRSLA does not allow broader 
standards such as negligence); Bondi, supra note 6, at 20 (arguing that collective scienter imposes 
a negligence standard inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent). 
 69 Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 475–76; see O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1614 (arguing that col-
lective scienter would promote “bad news lawsuits”); see also Crow, supra note 7, at 314 (sug-
gesting that, under a pure collective scienter standard, a statement made in New York could im-
pose liability on a corporation even if one low-level associate in India was aware of its falsity). 
 70 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (requiring that a plaintiff plead with particularity to give 
rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent); O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1613. Pleading to the 
general knowledge of all employees, despite lacking specific facts, does enable one to draw a 
reasonable inference that an agent was negligent in managing financial aspects of the corporation. 
O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1613. A reasonable inference, however, fails to meet the strong infer-
ence standard attached to the PSLRA. See id.; see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (“[T]he use 
of the words ‘manipulative,’ ‘device,’ and ‘contrivance’ [are] terms that make unmistakable a 
congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence.”). Moreover, 
some courts have argued that the language of the PSLRA does not permit collective scienter due 
to its reference to only a single “defendant.” See Phillips, 374 F.3d at 1018 (noting that 
“[a]lthough the plain language is less compelling with respect to alleging the scienter of each 
defendant, the statute does use the singular term ‘the defendant,’” thus holding that “the most 
plausible reason in light of congressional intent is that a plaintiff . . . must allege facts sufficiently 
demonstrating each defendant’s state of mind”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he 
complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.”). Absent any clear congressional guidance, this argument will remain a point of conten-
tion among the circuits. See Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (“[A] flexible, case-specific analysis is appropriate in examining scienter pleadings. 
Both the absence of any statutory language addressing particular methods of pleading and the 
inconclusive legislative history . . . indicate that Congress ultimately chose not to specify particu-
lar types of facts that would or would not show a strong inference of scienter.”). 
 71 See Teamsters Amici Curiae, supra note 68, at 3 (arguing that collective scienter does not 
fit within the language of the Exchange Act); Langevoort, supra note 60, at 128 (positing that an 
aggregation of knowledge rule would effectively create a negligence standard); Maslo, supra note 
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plaintiffs must plead recklessness for scienter in section 10(b) violations.72 
The PSLRA is designed to prevent a “mud against the wall” approach and 
to provide distinct claims against the defendant.73 
Third, some assert that strong collective scienter generates more litiga-
tion, which could have a chilling effect on a company’s willingness to dis-
close information to the public.74 This runs contrary to the philosophy of 
full disclosure embedded in the Exchange Act and ultimately has adverse 
effects on stockholders.75 
3. Hybrid Collective Scienter 
Hybrid collective scienter narrows the permissive scope of employee 
knowledge to management and the speaker of the alleged misstatement.76 
This version of collective scienter holds that corporate scienter can exist if 
the plaintiff pleads that a member of management knew the statements were 
false.77 This applies even if the particular member of management was not 
responsible for the alleged misstatement.78 Therefore, a plaintiff can com-
                                                                                                                           
32, at 98 (stating that collective scienter is akin to a negligence standard which is at odds with the 
PSLRA). 
 72 See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174 (affirming that negligence is insufficient to 
establish a valid section 10(b) violation); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (asserting that reck-
lessness is sufficient in some circumstances to plead scienter). 
 73 See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (suggesting that a complaint alleging a violation of securities 
laws can be created with little prior due diligence); see also Southland, 365 F.3d at 365 (noting 
that the PSLRA requires a plaintiff to distinguish individual defendants and provide particularized 
facts regarding their part in the fraud). 
 74 See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 5 (“According to the SEC: ‘the threat of mass shareholder litiga-
tion, whether real or perceived,’ has had adverse effects, especially in ‘chilling . . . disclosure of 
forward-looking information.’” (quoting Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange 
Act Release No. 33-7107, 57 S.E.C. Docket 1999 (Oct. 13, 1994))); Bondi, supra note 6, at 22–23 
(discussing how frivolous litigation chills corporate disclosure); Crow, supra note 7, at 327 (stat-
ing that scholars who argue against collective scienter argue that the theory slows or chills corpo-
rate communication).  
 75 See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186 (explaining the fundamental purpose 
of full disclosure in federal securities laws); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42–43 (“Share-
holders are also damaged due to the chilling effect of the current system on the robustness and 
candor of disclosure . . . .”). 
 76 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 12–13 (describing hybrid collective scienter); O’Riordan, supra 
note 7, at 1597 (introducing the hybrid or “weak” theory of collective scienter and its implications 
for management). 
 77 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 13 (explaining different approaches to corporate scienter); Jef-
fries, supra note 21, at 524–25 (discussing the “watered down” version of collective scienter); see 
also In re Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 452, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(imputing scienter of various management-level employees to the corporation); infra note 82 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Marsh & McLennan holding). 
 78 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 13 (stating that if a member of management knew a statement 
was false, that knowledge can be combined with any statement made by any agent of the compa-
ny); Jonathan W. Miller & Lyle Roberts, Outside Counsel: ‘Collective Scienter’ in Securities 
Fraud Cases, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 2008, at 5 (referring to a “narrow version” of collective scienter 
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bine the knowledge of a member of management with an alleged false 
statement made by an agent of the company in order to impute scienter to 
the corporation.79 This approach attempts to redress the narrow nature of 
respondeat superior, while avoiding some of the negative effects of pure 
collective scienter.80 
Though seemingly practical, the hybrid approach nevertheless has its 
shortcomings.81 Although it expands the scope beyond one corporate agent, 
it fails to establish how senior a non-speaking officer must be to have his or 
her scienter imputable to the corporation.82 Despite the willingness of some 
courts to adopt a flexible hybrid imputation approach, no clear standard has 
been widely adopted regarding which specific employees should be includ-
ed.83 
II. INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CIRCUITS ON COLLECTIVE SCIENTER 
This Part analyzes the different approaches circuits have taken to col-
lective scienter.84 Section A discusses circuits that have wholly rejected col-
                                                                                                                           
that allows scienter to be pled for a corporate defendant even if the officer is not a defendant and 
the false statement is made by an individual without scienter).  
 79 Bondi, supra note 6, at 14; see also City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688–90 (attributing aware-
ness of an officer without facts that linked the officer directly to the misrepresentation). 
 80 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 475–77 (describing how the middle ground approach address-
es the issues of each end of the collective scienter spectrum); supra notes 56–60 and accompany-
ing text (analyzing arguments against the respondeat superior approach); supra notes 67–75 and 
accompanying text (discussing objections to collective scienter). 
 81 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 13–14 (introducing the hybrid classification of collective scien-
ter and issues that follow from it); O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1619 (arguing that there are short-
falls of a “weak” or hybrid approach to collective scienter). 
 82 See S. Ferry, 542 F.3d at 784–85 (noting the possibility of pleading scienter based on man-
agement’s specific knowledge of core operations and an alleged fraud); Marsh & McLennan, 501 
F. Supp. 2d at 481 (concluding that a hybrid approach is favorable to the narrow approach but also 
recognizing that no line exists for how senior an employee must be to be considered “manage-
ment”). In 2006, in In re Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc. Securities Litigation, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York allowed the knowledge of a division head and senior 
vice president to be imputed to the corporation. See 501 F. Supp. 2d at 482; see also In re BISYS 
Sec. Litig., 397 F. Supp. 2d 430, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (imputing scienter of regional vice presi-
dent and vice president of corporate finance). The court raised the issue of drawing the line for 
imputing management, however, the court did not settle the issue. See Marsh & McLennan, 501 
F. Supp. 2d at 481 (noting that there is no set standard for how senior an employee must be in 
order to have his or her scienter imputed to the corporation); see also Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, 
Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003) (asserting that the scienter of a senior controlling of-
ficer can be attributed to a corporation). 
 83 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 473 (noting the wide divergence among circuits and scholars 
regarding corporate scienter); Bondi, supra note 6, at 14; O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1622 (rais-
ing the question of where to draw the line with hybrid collective scienter). 
 84 See infra notes 87–123 and accompanying text. 
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lective scienter.85 Section B discusses the circuits that have not taken a de-
finitive stance on the collective scienter issue.86 
A. Setting a Bright Line: Circuits’ Rejection of Collective Scienter 
In order to maintain a narrow, bright-line standard, the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the common law 
principle of respondeat superior for pleading scienter.87 In 2004, in South-
land Securities Corp. v. INSpire Insurance Solutions, Inc., the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that section 10(b) pleadings must give 
notice to each defendant as to his or her particular role in the alleged 
fraud.88 The court concluded that when analyzing a statement made by a 
corporation to find scienter, it must examine only the state of mind of the 
corporate official who made the statement, or those who ordered or contrib-
uted to the statement.89 The court concluded that collective scienter would 
establish a negligence standard, which would directly conflict with the 
heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA.90  
In another 2004 decision, in Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also favored a narrow approach to 
collective scienter.91 The Eleventh Circuit relied on congressional intent in 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 94–123 and accompanying text. 
 87 See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(fully rejecting the notion of collective scienter); see also Phillips v. Sci.-Atl., Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 
1018–19 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the most effective approach to pleading scienter re-
quires each plaintiff to plead facts regarding the state of mind of every defendant). 
 88 Southland, 365 F.3d at 365 (concluding that the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead facts 
regarding each individual defendant’s role in the alleged fraud). In Southland, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the defendant insurance company and its officers engaged in a fraudulent scheme to 
deceive investors about the company’s performance in order to inflate its stock prices. Id. at 360. 
 89 Id. at 366 (stating that in order to find scienter, courts should “look to the state of mind of 
the individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement . . . rather than gener-
ally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s officers and employees”). Southland re-
mains the seminal case in the Fifth Circuit regarding collective scienter. See Lee v. Active Power, 
Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 876, 881 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“[T]he Court concludes Southland still is control-
ling law on the issue of imputation . . . .”); Stone v. Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 3d 
575, 611–12 (W.D. Tex 2014) (concluding that the plaintiff adequately pled scienter as required 
under Southland). 
 90 See Southland, 365 F.3d at 365 (“[E]ven if a corporate officer’s position supports a reason-
able inference that he likely would be negligent in not being involved in the preparation of a doc-
ument or aware of its contents, the PSLRA state of mind requirement is severe recklessness or 
actual knowledge.”). 
 91 See Phillips, 374 F.3d at 1018–19 (noting that it was not necessary to address the group 
pleading doctrine because the defendants satisfied the Fifth Circuit approach); see also In re Om-
nicare, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Omnicare II), 769 F.3d 455, 473–74 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that the Elev-
enth Circuit implicitly followed the Fifth Circuit respondeat superior approach). In Phillips, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant corporation fraudulently misrepresented its financial perfor-
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adopting the Fifth Circuit’s scienter approach.92 The court did not view this 
standard as too stringent because all of the relevant facts and inferences 
from plaintiffs’ pleadings were not analyzed in isolation and could be ag-
gregated to achieve PSLRA standards.93 
B. Not Entirely Sure: Circuits That Have Not Committed 
Several circuits have yet to fully weigh in on either side of the collec-
tive scienter debate.94 This section analyzes the scienter case law in these 
undecided circuits.95 Subsection 1 analyzes the Seventh, Second, and Fourth 
Circuits’ collective scienter jurisprudence.96 Next, subsection 2 reviews the 
Ninth Circuit’s movement from pure rejection to the undecided middle 
camp of corporate scienter.97 
1. Seventh, Second, and Fourth Circuits Open to the Possibility 
In 2008, after the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the respondeat superior 
approach to scienter in Makors Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (“Tell-
abs II”), but left open the possibility of a broader view of corporate scien-
ter.98 The court quoted the Fifth Circuit and held that establishing corporate 
                                                                                                                           
mance and consumer demand for its products. See Complaint for Violation of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 at 10–15, Phillips, 374 F.3d 1015 (No. 03-13008). 
 92 Phillips, 374 F.3d at 1018. The court stated,  
Although the plain language is less compelling with respect to alleging the scienter 
of each defendant, the [PSLRA] does use the singular term ‘the defendant,’ and we 
believe that the most plausible reading in light of congressional intent is that a plain-
tiff . . . must allege facts sufficiently demonstrating each defendant’s state of mind. 
Id. Congressional intent behind the PSLRA was to heighten the pleading standard for private secu-
rities fraud cases in order to combat frivolous litigation. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) 
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (“This legislation implements needed 
procedural protections to discourage frivolous litigation.”); supra notes 38–44 and accompanying 
text (discussing legislative intent behind the PSLRA).  
 93 Phillips, 374 F.3d at 1018 n.6 (explaining the court’s treatment of all facts and inferences in 
the plaintiffs’ pleadings).  
 94 See Glazer v. Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2008) (reason-
ing that previous Ninth Circuit precedent has not completely ruled out collective scienter); Team-
sters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195–96 (2d Cir. 
2008) (drawing guidance from the Seventh Circuit); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. 
(Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that it is possible to raise an inference 
of scienter without regard to individual defendants). 
 95 See infra notes 98–123 and accompanying text. 
 96 See infra notes 98–114 and accompanying text. 
 97 See infra notes 115–123 and accompanying text. 
 98 See Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 704, 708, 710; see also supra notes 45–48 and accompanying 
text (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that defined a strong inference of scienter). In 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (“Tellabs II”), plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
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liability requires looking into the minds of the corporate officials involved 
in the issued misstatement, not the collective knowledge of the corpora-
tion.99 In dicta, however, the court suggested that certain dramatic situations 
could provide corporate scienter without the necessity of providing facts of 
individual states of mind.100 The court offered the following hypothetical to 
illustrate its point:  
Suppose General Motors announced it had sold one million SUVs 
in 2006, and the actual number was zero. There would be a strong 
inference of corporate scienter, since so dramatic an announcement 
would have been approved by corporate officials sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the company to know that the announcement 
was false.101 
Thus, the opinion conceivably reserves pleading corporate scienter without 
facts regarding individuals for dramatic announcements approved by man-
agement or executives.102 But, the court determined that no doctrinal expan-
sion was necessary in the case before it because the plaintiffs had sufficient-
ly pleaded that the CEO had the requisite scienter to defraud.103 
In 2008, in Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. 
Dynex Capital, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ad-
dressed, albeit incompletely, the issue of imputing corporate scienter.104 The 
court ruled that in order to impose liability against a corporation, a plaintiff 
must prove that an agent of the corporation committed a culpable act with 
                                                                                                                           
violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through a series of public announcements that fabricated 
demand for the corporation’s products. See 513 F.3d at 706. 
 99 See Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 708 (citing Southland, 365 F.3d at 366). 
 100 Id. at 710 (hinting that it is still possible to draw a strong inference of corporate scienter 
without specifically naming the individuals who conducted the fraudulent activities).  
101 Id.  
 102 See id.; Warren R. Stern & Joshua A. Naftalis, Corporate Scienter Revisited, SEC. LITIG. 
REP., Sept. 2008, at 1 (analyzing the implications of the Tellabs II opinion).  
 103 See Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 711. In a different case a few months after Tellabs II, the Sev-
enth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to impute the scienter of what they contended was a sen-
ior-level employee. See Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2008). The court 
rejected the argument that the employee was a senior-level officer because the employee was not 
listed as an executive officer in the company’s SEC filings. Id. at 698. Following Tellabs II, the 
court also stated, in dicta, that it was possible to draw a strong inference of corporate scienter 
without naming the particular individuals who perpetuated the fraud. See Tribune, 521 F.3d at 697 
n.5. Based on these two holdings, it appears that the Seventh Circuit may be willing to impute the 
knowledge of an executive officer under the inference that the officer approved a particular corpo-
rate statement. See Stern & Naftalis, supra note 102 (analyzing the Seventh Circuit’s rulings). 
 104 See Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 195. In Teamsters, the plaintiffs alleged that the financial ser-
vices defendant Dynex concealed its faulty underwriting practices and misrepresented the cause 
behind its financial losses. See id. at 193. The complaint alleged that Dynex had purchased loans 
made to “uncreditworthy borrowers” in an effort to enter the manufactured homes market, and 
those borrowers ultimately defaulted. Id. 
712 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:695 
the necessary scienter.105 In pleading scienter, however, the court held that a 
plaintiff need only create a strong inference that someone whose intent 
could be imputed to the corporation acted with the requisite scienter in or-
der to survive a motion to dismiss.106 Citing the Tellabs II decision, the 
court noted that it is possible to raise an inference of scienter without regard 
to a specific defendant.107 Similar to Tellabs II and the Seventh Circuit, the 
Second Circuit rejected the notion of collective scienter as a means to im-
pose liability, but did not completely foreclose its use for pleading purpos-
es.108 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit has also kept the possibility open for a 
pleading standard that is closer to collective scienter.109 In 2007, in Teach-
ers’ Retirement System of Louisiana v. Hunter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs must allege facts in regard to “at least 
one authorized agent” of a defendant corporation in order to plead requisite 
scienter.110 The court initially cited the Fifth Circuit with approval regard-
ing the scienter allegations.111 The court also implied, however, that collec-
tive scienter could be applicable in certain instances.112 In 2009, in Matrix 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See id. at 195 (differentiating between pleading standards and more stringent liability 
standards). 
 106 See id. The court did note that the most direct way to raise an inference of scienter is to 
plead it for an individual defendant. Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. at 196 (“Congress has imposed strict requirements on securities fraud pleading, but 
we do not believe they have imposed [a] rule . . . that in no case can corporate scienter be pleaded 
in the absence of successfully pleading scienter as to an expressly named officer.”); Tellabs II, 513 
F.3d at 710. Despite the court’s view, it held that the plaintiffs did not adequately plead scienter 
and remanded the case, allowing the plaintiffs to replead with specific facts. See Teamsters, 531 
F.3d at 196–97. 
 109 See Yates v. Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC, 744 F.3d 874, 890 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the 
“core operations” theory); Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 
189–90 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a complaint can give rise to a strong inference of scienter 
without identifying an individual corporate agent); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 
162, 184 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that if a defendant is a corporation, the plaintiff must allege facts 
that support scienter for at least one authorized agent). 
 110 See Teachers’ Ret., 477 F.3d at 168 (“[I]f the defendant is a corporation, the plaintiff must 
allege facts that support a strong inference of scienter with respect to at least one authorized agent 
of the corporation, since corporate liability derives from the actions of its agents.”). 
 111 See id. at 184 (“Thus, to allege a securities fraud claim against individual defendants, a 
plaintiff must allege facts that support a ‘strong inference’ that each defendant acted with at least 
recklessness in making the false statement.”). In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant 
Cree, Inc. and six corporate officers and directors misrepresented a series of transactions with 
other companies to artificially inflate the company’s stock. See First Amended Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint at 2–3, In re Cree, Inc., Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 461 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (No. 
1:03CV549). 
 112 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 13 n.48 (examining how the Fourth Circuit took an ambiguous 
position on collective scienter). The language “at least one authorized agent,” as opposed to 
speaker or spokesperson, suggests that the Fourth Circuit would possibly allow a broader form of 
collective scienter pleading than the Fifth Circuit. See id. (suggesting that the Teachers’ Retire-
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Capital Management Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit further qualified its Teachers’ Retirement hold-
ing.113 Although the court conceded that most often a plaintiff’s complaint 
identifies a particular corporate agent, it noted that this practice is not an 
absolute requirement.114  
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Movement to the Middle 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit likely has seen the 
greatest change in its position on collective scienter since the enactment of 
the PSLRA.115 In 1995, in Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., the Ninth 
Circuit heard its first post-PSLRA section 10(b) pleading case and com-
pletely rejected the theory of collective scienter.116 The defendant insurer 
argued that the plaintiff corporation could be directly liable for the fraudu-
lent acts of the directors and officers because it is possible that the corpora-
tion would have the necessary intent to establish liability under the theory 
of collective scienter.117 The court squarely rejected this argument, stating 
that no case law exists to support a collective scienter theory.118 Then, in 
                                                                                                                           
ment holding could allow a more plaintiff-friendly pleading standard). Compare Teachers’ Ret., 
477 F.3d at 184 (requiring particularized facts of at least one authorized agent), with Southland, 
365 F.3d at 366 (requiring that a plaintiff plead facts regarding the scienter of corporate officials 
who made or issued the alleged fraudulent statement). 
 113 See Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 182 (referring to the Teachers’ Retirement holding and 
noting “this court has not yet discussed the extent to which a plaintiff must identify that agent”). In 
dicta, the court applied the hypothetical used in Tellabs II in light of the circuit’s previous ruling. 
See id. at 190.  
 114 See id. at 189. The court did, however, agree that when plaintiffs name individual defend-
ants, they must allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter as to each individual defend-
ant. Id. at 190; cf. Yates, 744 F.3d at 890 (holding that attempting to plead the core operations 
theory in alleging scienter without “establishing the defendant’s actual exposure to the . . . prob-
lem . . . falls short of the PSLRA’s particularity requirement”). 
 115 Compare Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (es-
tablishing complete rejection of collective scienter), with Glazer, 549 F.3d at 744 (holding that 
there could be some circumstances in which pleading collective scienter may be appropriate). 
 116 See Nordstrom, 54 F.3d at 1435. This case involved a dispute over the defendant insurers 
obligations, as Nordstrom’s insurance providers, to cover a settlement amount resulting from a 
class action securities fraud lawsuit against Nordstrom. See id. at 1427. One of the defendant in-
surers only agreed to pay half of the settlement because both the corporation (the uninsured entity) 
and the directors and officers (insured entities) were named as defendants in the underlying suit. 
Id. at 1433. 
 117 Id. at 1433. 
 118 Id. at 1435 (“[T]here is no case law supporting an independent ‘collective scienter’ theo-
ry.”). The court also held that there was no evidence in this case to support collective scienter 
without finding that one of the individual director or officer defendants also had the requisite in-
tent. Id. The Fifth Circuit cited the Nordstrom holding in establishing its support of a respondeat 
superior stance in 2004. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 366. 
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2005, in In re Apple Computer, Inc., the Ninth Circuit maintained its firm 
stance against collective scienter.119 
In 2008, in Glazer Capital Management LP v. Magistri, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit significantly retreated from its previous 
position on collective scienter and instead joined the middle camp of the 
split.120 The court stated that the In re Apple Computer opinion overstated 
its position in Nordstrom and at that time the circuit had not categorically 
rejected collective scienter.121 Citing the Seventh Circuit’s Tellabs II deci-
sion, the court observed that certain circumstances may render collective 
scienter appropriate.122 Despite this openness to broader forms of pleading 
scienter, the court still required the plaintiffs to plead scienter with respect 
to the individuals who made the false statements.123 
III. OMNICARE TRIES A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
This Part examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 
approach to collective scienter both before and after its 2014 decision in In 
re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Omnicare II”), and compares its 
scienter test to other circuits.124 Section A provides an overview of the Sixth 
Circuit’s previous corporate scienter approach and the procedural history 
leading up to Omnicare II.125 Section B details the Omnicare II holding and 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 303 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A corporation is 
deemed to have the requisite scienter for fraud only if the individual corporate officer making the 
statement has the requisite level of scienter at the time that he or she makes the statement.” (em-
phasis added)). 
 120 See Glazer, 549 F.3d at 744 (allowing the possibility that certain circumstances could be 
appropriate in applying collective scienter). The plaintiffs in Glazer Capital alleged that the de-
fendant made misrepresentations in a merger agreement by not disclosing what were later revealed 
to be potential regulatory violations. See id. at 739. 
 121 See id. at 744 (concluding that the Ninth Circuit has not categorically rejected collective 
scienter). 
 122 Id. (reasoning that Nordstrom does not foreclose the possibility of collective scienter under 
certain circumstances); see Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710; see also S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 
542 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that there are rare circumstances where the underlying 
facts surrounding the fraud are so blatant it would be “absurd” to suggest that management did not 
know about it). 
 123 See Glazer, 549 F.3d at 745 (“We need not decide whether we agree with [Tellabs II] 
because the facts of this case are different from the hypothetical in [Tellabs II] . . . we are thus not 
faced with whether, in some circumstances, it might be possible to plead scienter under a collec-
tive theory.”). More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California ruled 
that plaintiffs did not present facts establishing a circumstance where collective scienter would be 
applicable as described in Glazer Capital. See In re Maxwell Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 18 
F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1032 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (“Plaintiff’s claims are based upon statements by the 
individual defendants and in official filings signed by the individual defendants. It is thus neces-
sary to require scienter as to the individuals who were responsible for the statements.”). 
124 See infra notes 128–175 and accompanying text.  
125 See infra notes 128–146 and accompanying text. 
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new corporate scienter test. 126 Lastly, section C draws parallels between 
parts of the Omnicare test and approaches adopted in other courts.127 
A. Sixth Circuit Pre-Omnicare 
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the 
collective scienter issue in City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. 
Bridgestone Corp.128 The plaintiffs named the corporation and its subsidiary 
along with two corporate executives as defendants.129 One of the executives 
was Masatoshi Ono, the Executive Vice President of Bridgestone and CEO 
of its subsidiary, Firestone.130 Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs’ biggest chal-
lenge was pleading scienter because Ono was not involved in the alleged 
misstatements.131  
Taking a different approach, the Sixth Circuit allowed Ono’s knowledge 
of false reports to be imputed to the corporation despite the plaintiffs’ failure 
to link him to the issuance of the statements.132 The court inferred that Ono 
had acquired knowledge of the corporation’s alleged tire defects from certain 
company meetings where complaints, governmental investigations, and set-
tlements were discussed.133 Therefore, because Ono had knowledge and was 
acting within his capacity as an employee in these meetings, his mental state 
was directly attributable to Bridgestone.134 
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit took guidance from a 2003 
case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Adams v. Kinder-
                                                                                                                           
126 See infra notes 147–162 and accompanying text. 
127 See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text. 
 128 See City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 688–89 (6th Cir. 
2005) (addressing the issue of corporate scienter and whether an officer’s awareness can be im-
puted to the corporation regardless of whether he or she issued the misleading statements). The 
defendant Bridgestone and its subsidiary Firestone were accused of providing false and misleading 
information regarding product quality in annual reports from 1997–2000. See Complaint for Vio-
lation of the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 at 1–2, City of Monroe, 399 F.3d 651 (No. 03-5505) [herein-
after City of Monroe Complaint]. These misrepresentations not only hurt the value of the corpora-
tion’s stock, but also led to numerous car accidents. See id. at 1, 8. 
 129 City of Monroe Complaint, supra note 128, at 9–10. 
 130 Id. at 10. 
 131 See City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 668, 690 (discussing the district court’s rejection of the 
plaintiffs’ attempts to plead scienter); see also Crow, supra note 7, at 331 (describing the plain-
tiffs’ challenge of meeting PSLRA standards). Although the plaintiffs could not link Ono directly 
to the fraudulent statements, they maintained that he had actual knowledge that the statements 
were false and misleading. See City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688–89. 
 132 See City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688, 690.  
 133 See id.  
 134 See id. (“Ono’s awareness of the claims as gleaned from these meetings is directly at-
tributable to Bridgestone because ‘knowledge of a corporate officer or agent acting within the 
scope of [his] authority is attributable to the corporation.’” (quoting HAZEN,  supra note 39, 
§ 12.8[4])). 
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Morgan, Inc.135 The Tenth Circuit in Kinder-Morgan had held that the sci-
enter of the senior controlling officers of a corporation may be imputed 
when the officers are acting within the scope of their apparent authority.136 
Expanding on Kinder-Morgan, the Sixth Circuit in City of Monroe permit-
ted the knowledge of any corporate officer or agent to be attributed to a 
corporation. 137  By extending imputation to any agent acting within the 
scope of employment, the Sixth Circuit adopted a much broader view of 
corporate scienter that could have cast an overly vast net of corporate liabil-
ity.138 
In 2013, in In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Omnicare I”), a 
group of shareholders brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky against pharmaceutical provider Omnicare and 
several of its senior management. 139 The plaintiffs accused Omnicare of 
misleading stockholders regarding the company’s compliance with Medi-
care and Medicaid billing regulations.140 The plaintiffs alleged that Omnica-
re made material misrepresentations in compliance reports and in state-
ments made by executives, while simultaneously concealing its fraudulent 
activities.141 Eventually, Omnicare’s compliance violations were revealed in 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See id.; Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1106 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 136 See Kinder-Morgan, 340 F.3d at 1106 (“The scienter of the senior controlling officers of a 
corporation may be attributed to the corporation itself to establish liability as a primary violator of 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when those senior officials were acting within the scope of their apparent 
authority.”). This was the quotation cited in the City of Monroe opinion, and which played a role 
in imputing Ono’s knowledge to the corporation. See City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688. 
 137 See McCaughey & Demers, supra note 11, at 858 (stating that City of Monroe was a tacit 
endorsement of broad collective scienter). Compare Kinder-Morgan, 340 F.3d at 1106 (limiting 
imputation of scienter to senior controlling officers acting within the scope of employment), with 
City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688 (attributing scienter of any corporate officer or agent acting with-
in the scope of employment).  
 138 See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Omnicare II), 769 F.3d 455, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(acknowledging that the City of Monroe holding could excessively expand corporate liability); see 
also Crow, supra note 7, at 314 (identifying a scenario that highlights the potential consequences 
of collective scienter). Furthermore, City of Monroe allowed Ono’s scienter to be imputed despite 
a lack of facts illustrating his involvement in the misrepresentations. See City of Monroe, 399 F.3d 
at 690 (plaintiffs did not allege direct responsibility or even facts that Ono was involved in dis-
seminating Firestone’s false data). In contrast, the plaintiffs in Kinder-Morgan adequately estab-
lished the scienter of two executive officers directly involved in the fraudulent activity. See Kind-
er-Morgan, 340 F.3d at 1106. The court held that the plaintiffs’ complaint established scienter to 
defraud through financial statements signed by both defendants. See id. at 1105–06.  
 139 See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Omnicare I), No. 11-cv-173-DLB-CJS, 2013 WL 
1248243, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 27, 2013), aff’d, Omnicare II, 769 F.3d 455; Consolidated Amend-
ed Complaint at 4, 14, Omnicare II, 769 F.3d 455 (No. 2:11-CV-00173-DLB-CJS) [hereinafter 
Omnicare Complaint].  
 140 Omnicare Complaint, supra note 139, at 4, 14. Omnicare concealed from investors a wide-
spread scheme to defraud Medicare and Medicaid by seeking and obtaining reimbursement for 
medical claims that did not comply with the regulations of either program. Id. at 2. 
 141See Omnicare I, 2013 WL 1248243, at *3–4. 
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a federal qui tam action, which exposed shareholders to hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in damages.142 
The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that 
the plaintiffs failed to plead an actionable misrepresentation or omission.143 
The court also addressed the plaintiffs’ new position, presented during oral 
arguments, which relied on City of Monroe to impute the collective scienter 
of non-party employees to Omnicare.144 The court stated that the plaintiffs 
failed to support their assertion that the knowledge of non-defendant em-
ployees who were not involved in the alleged misstatements should be im-
puted to the defendant corporation.145 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the 
plaintiffs continued to rely on City of Monroe in arguing that the mental 
state of corporate insiders can be imputed to the corporation even if those 
individuals are not personally liable under section 10(b).146 
B. Omnicare’s Proposed Hybrid Scienter Standard 
In 2014, in In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Omnicare II”), 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit attempted to establish a 
pragmatic standard for imputing corporate scienter.147 Finding that none of 
the approaches adopted by other circuits, including previous Sixth Circuit 
decisions, struck the appropriate balance, the court set forth a middle 
ground, or hybrid scienter standard.148 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Omnicare Complaint, supra note 139, at 2. A qui tam action is an action in which a private 
party (called a relator) brings an action on the government’s behalf. See Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009). 
 143 Omnicare I, 2013 WL 1248243, at *5.  
144 See id. at *4, *11; Lead Plaintiff’s Post-Hearing Memorandum in Further Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, Omnicare I, No. 2:11-cv-173-DLB-CJS (E.D. Ky. Feb. 21, 
2013), 2013 WL 7117710. Citing City of Monroe as authority, the plaintiff attempted to argue that 
the knowledge of senior-level employees, including non-defendants, could be imputed to Omnica-
re. See Omnicare I, 2013 WL 1248243, at *11. 
145 See Omnicare I, 2013 WL 1248243, at *11 (“[P]laintiff fails to cite primary authority 
where the knowledge of a nondefendant employee, who did not make the compliance statement, 
was imputed to the company for purposes of finding that a corporation had actual knowledge 
. . . .”). This is distinguished from City of Monroe because that case imputed the knowledge of an 
employee-defendant named in the case. See City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688. The court further 
concluded that even if the court were to impute the knowledge of non-defendant employees to the 
corporation, the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient facts to support actual knowledge of the falsi-
ty of the statements. See Omnicare I, 2013 WL 1248243, at *11. 
146 See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 37–38, Omnicare II, 769 F.3d 455 (No. 13-
5597) (stating that “[City of Monroe] held that a corporation’s mental state could be established 
through the imputed knowledge of a corporate official who was not personally liable under Sec-
tion 10(b)”). The plaintiffs cited case law attributing knowledge from an agent of the defendant 
corporation and not just senior officers. See id.  
 147 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 475–76. 
 148 Id. (“Given that neither approach is ideal, a middle ground is necessary.”). 
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In order to create a more functional standard, the court held that for 
purposes of determining the scienter of a corporation under section 10(b), a 
plaintiff may plead facts regarding the state of mind of any of three specific 
categories of agents.149 The first category is the individual corporate agent 
who actually uttered or issued the misrepresentation.150 The second catego-
ry is any individual agent who authorized, requested, aided, or approved a 
misrepresentation prior to its utterance.151  
The final category of agent is any “high managerial agent or member 
of the board of directors” who approved or recklessly disregarded or toler-
ated a misrepresentation after it is stated.152 The Sixth Circuit derived this 
part of its rule from section 2.07 of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”).153 The 
MPC defines a high managerial agent as: “an officer of a corporation . . . or 
any other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such re-
sponsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy 
of the corporation or association.”154 Despite the court’s new interpretation 
of corporate scienter, it held that the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts 
to meet the heightened standard under the PSLRA.155 
In adopting this new standard, the court sought to widen the permissi-
ble realm of imputable agents beyond strict respondeat superior. 156  The 
                                                                                                                           
149 See id. at 476. 
150 See id.  
151 See id. The first two prongs of the scienter standard are analogous to the Fifth Circuit’s 
more traditional respondeat superior approach to corporate scienter. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. 
INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (limiting the inquiry to corporate 
officials who actually made or contributed to the statement); infra notes 166–169 (describing the 
influence the Fifth Circuit had in the Omnicare II holding).  
152 Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476. 
 153 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“A corporation may be convict-
ed of the commission of an offense if . . . the commission of the offense was authorized, request-
ed, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high manage-
rial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment.”); cf. 
Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (“The state(s) of mind of any of the following are probative for the 
purposes of determining . . . requisite scienter . . . . Any high managerial agent or member of the 
board of directors who ratified, recklessly disregarded, or tolerated the misrepresentation after its 
utterance or issuance . . . .” (quoting Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 135)). 
 154 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c); see also Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 146 n.210 
(defining high managerial agent as part of the authors’ proposed scienter rule, which was partially 
adopted by the Omnicare II court); Christopher R. Green, Punishing Corporations: The Food-
Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Liability and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. 
REV. 197, 204–05 (2008) (discussing the Model Penal Code’s rules for corporate crime). 
 155 Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 483. Although the court agreed that the vice president of internal 
audit’s knowledge was imputable to the corporation, the plaintiffs ultimately failed to allege 
enough facts to overcome the PSLRA’s pleading burden. See id. 
156 See id. at 475, 477 (discussing how its rule prevents corporate policies of willful blindness 
and information shielding from helping corporations evade liability); see also McCaughey & 
Demers, supra note 11, at 858 (stating that the Omnicare II holding expanded Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity). 
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court also aimed to prevent corporations from evading liability through 
“tacit encouragement and willful ignorance.”157 As a result, corporate de-
fendants that permit or endorse low-level employees to knowingly shield 
information from management will still be found liable.158 This, the court 
reasoned, fostered the accountability principles embedded in the Exchange 
Act’s original purpose.159  
Aside from the third category of the Omnicare test, the court limited 
the scienter analysis to agents who participated in the alleged misstatement 
in order to prevent an overbroad application of a pure collective scienter 
approach.160 Therefore, the only low-level employees whose scienter can be 
imputed to the corporation are those connected to the fraudulent state-
ments.161 The court indicated that the narrower focus of its test would pro-
tect corporations from strike suits, thus balancing the polarizing aims of the 
PSLRA with the Exchange Act.162 
C. Omnicare: Similarities with Other Circuits 
The Omnicare test is essentially a combination of different holdings 
adopted throughout the federal circuits.163 This middle ground standard ef-
                                                                                                                           
 157 Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477; see also William Foley et al., Circuits Split on When to 
Impute Employee’s Knowledge to Corporations for Section 10(b) Claims, ORRICK SEC. LITIG., 
INVESTIGATIONS & ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Oct. 21, 2014), http://blogs.orrick.com/securities-
litigation/2014/10/21/circuits-split-on-when-to-impute-employees-knowledge-to-corporation-for-s
ection-10b-claims/ [http://perma.cc/WSJ9-X8U5] (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s stance regarding 
the flaws of other approaches). 
 158 Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477; see also Maslo, supra note 32, at 97 (discussing the tactics 
companies can employ to avoid liability under a respondeat superior approach). 
 159 Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477; see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A fundamental purpose, common to these statutes, was to substitute a 
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high stand-
ard of business ethics in the securities industry.”); Foley et al., supra note 157, at 1–2 (describing 
the balancing of interests in the Omnicare II decision). 
 160 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476; see also William O. Fisher, Caselaw Developments 
2014, 70 BUS. LAW. 903, 957 (2015) (describing the Omnicare II court’s rejection of the plain-
tiffs’ attempt to plead broad collective scienter). 
 161 See Bondali v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 620 F. App’x 483, 493 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that 
although some employees were aware of the fraud, the plaintiffs did not allege facts that those 
employees were involved in preparing or making the false statements); Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 
476–77; see also Lyle Roberts, Middle Ground, 10B-5 DAILY (Oct. 24, 2014, 11:14 PM), http://
10b5daily.com/2014/10/24/middle-ground/ [http://perma.cc/D3DA-2U44] (discussing the Omnicare 
II holding). 
 162 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476–77; see also Joseph M. McLaughlin, Pleading Corpo-
rate Scienter: Circuits Split on Standard, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 11, 2014, at 5 (discussing the balance the 
Omnicare II holding attempts to strike). 
 163 See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(requiring pleading facts regarding individuals who made or were involved in false statements but 
not foreclosing the notion of collective scienter); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund 
v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that a plaintiff need not al-
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fectively addresses some of the holes in the scienter pleading standards 
adopted by other circuits.164 Nevertheless, the Omnicare II ruling answered 
only part of the corporate scienter issue because it failed to define precisely 
what constitutes a “high managerial agent.”165 
First, the Omnicare test embraced the Fifth Circuit’s approach for 
pleading scienter as a means to support the PSLRA’s intended purpose.166 
By requiring specific scienter allegations of individuals involved in corpo-
rate misstatements, the Fifth Circuit’s approach promotes the PSLRA’s goal 
of preventing strike suits and encouraging disclosure.167 Like the Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, the first two criteria of the Omnicare II standard leave the 
issues of compartmentalized knowledge and lack of accountability unre-
solved.168 The final provision of the Omnicare II court’s standard addresses 
this imbalance by broadening its scope to be more akin to other circuits and 
prior Sixth Circuit decisions.169 
                                                                                                                           
ways plead scienter to one individual agent); Southland, 365 F.3d at 366 (requiring scienter analy-
sis of corporate official or officials who make or contribute to a misstatement); see also infra notes 
166–175 and accompanying text (describing the similarities of the Omnicare test with other case 
law). 
 164 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 475–77; Lyle Roberts, Being of One Mind: Corporate Scien-
ter and Securities Fraud Liability, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 2015: FROM INVESTIGATION TO 
TRIAL 207, 213 (2015) (stating that the first two categories of the Omnicare rule are in line with 
the Fifth Circuit). 
 165 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (citing Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 135) (adopting 
a corporate scienter rule that utilizes the MPC definition of “high managerial agent”); Lipton, 
supra note 31, at 1292 (stating that the high managerial agent standard under the MPC will overly 
extend the margins of corporate liability); infra notes 194–215 and accompanying text (addressing 
the lack of clarity with the term “high managerial agent”). 
 166 Compare Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (“The [following] state(s) of mind . . . are proba-
tive for . . . determining . . . requisite scienter . . . a. The individual agent who uttered or issued the 
misrepresentation; b. Any individual agent who authorized, requested, commanded, furnished 
information for, prepared (including suggesting or contributing language . . .), reviewed or ap-
proved the statement . . . .” (quoting Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 135)), with Southland, 365 
F.3d at 366 (“For purposes of determining . . . scienter we . . . look to the state of mind of the 
individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or 
its making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion therein, or the like) 
. . . .”). 
167 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 741 (“Abusive litigation severely affects the willingness of corporate managers to disclose 
information to the marketplace.”); see also Bondi, supra note 6, at 22–23 (discussing the disclo-
sure repercussions of imposing a negligence equivalent pleading standard that would follow from 
a collective scienter approach). 
 168 See United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting 
that corporations compartmentalize knowledge); see also Abril & Olazábal, supra note 7, at 144 
(discussing the difficulty of locating a single agent within an organization possessing both the 
requisite scienter and connection to a given misrepresentation); Wohl, supra note 44, at 3 (discuss-
ing how a single agent approach could lead to compartmentalizing knowledge, which would un-
dermine effective corporate compliance programs). 
 169 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477 (discussing how the court’s holding will prevent willful 
ignorance); see also Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 710 
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Second, the final part of the Omnicare test, which considers the scien-
ter of any high managerial agent or board member, was built from the ex-
pansiveness of the Sixth Circuit’s earlier City of Monroe holding.170 The 
Omnicare II court reasoned that the City of Monroe approach could expose 
corporations to too much liability. 171 More specifically, the term “agent” 
could result in broad liability for corporations so long as any single employ-
ee (regardless of level) within the organization knew something culpable.172 
The Omnicare II court qualified its prior ruling by limiting the inquiry of 
those not involved in the misstatement to high managerial agents and the 
board of directors.173 This limitation was intended to prevent the extreme 
consequences of a pure collective scienter standard.174 This departure from 
City of Monroe’s overly broad language brought the third part of the Om-
nicare II rule more in line with the Tenth Circuit precedent that originally 
influenced the Sixth Circuit to expand its scienter approach.175 
IV. A BETTER STANDARD, BUT ONE AMBIGUITY LEFT BEHIND 
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 2014 deci-
sion in In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Omnicare II”) was a step 
in the right direction for securities fraud pleading, further revision is neces-
sary.176 This Part argues that the Omnicare test is the proper standard for 
corporate scienter, but that the issue of what constitutes a “high managerial 
agent” must be addressed and clarified.177 Section A discusses how the Om-
nicare rule bridges the current scienter gap in undecided circuits.178 Next, 
section B argues that term “high managerial agent” should be limited to of-
                                                                                                                           
(7th Cir. 2008) (suggesting the possibility of establishing corporate scienter without pleading facts 
regarding specific individuals who publicized the fraud); City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688–89 
(allowing the knowledge of a corporate officer who did not issue the misleading statement to be 
imputed to the corporation). 
 170 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (looking to any high managerial agent or board member 
who ratified, recklessly disregarded, or tolerated a misrepresentation to impute scienter and stating 
that its rule is consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s previous pronouncement in City of Monroe); see 
also supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text (discussing the City of Monroe holding).  
 171 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 475 (“[R]eading our decision in City of Monroe too broadly 
could expose corporations to liability far beyond what Congress has authorized.”); City of Mon-
roe, 399 F.3d at 688. 
 172 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 475–76; see also Foley et al., supra note 157, at 1 (discuss-
ing the Omnicare II court’s criticism of City of Monroe); supra notes 67–75 and accompanying 
text (discussing criticism of collective scienter). 
 173 Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476–77. 
 174 See id. at 477. 
175 See City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 688 (citing Kinder-Morgan, 340 F.3d at 1106); supra 
notes 135–138 (analyzing the Tenth Circuit’s influence on the City of Monroe holding).  
 176 See infra notes 194–215 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra notes 181–228 and accompanying text. 
 178 See infra notes 181–193 and accompanying text. 
722 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:695 
ficers.179 Finally, section C addresses potential policy objections to the re-
fined Omnicare rule.180 
A. Why Omnicare Would Move Some Circuits Away from Uncertainty 
The Omnicare test bridges the gap between both sides of the corporate 
scienter split, and thus is a feasible alternative to the ambivalence that per-
meates the circuit courts.181 Undecided circuits have accepted the minimum 
requirements of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach from its 2004 
decision in Southland Securities Corp. v. INSpire Insurance Solutions, Inc., 
but have simultaneously left themselves open to a broader view of scienter 
that the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected.182 Pleadings that allege facts satis-
fying the narrow requirements of the Fifth Circuit’s approach are accepted 
as valid in virtually all circuits.183 Therefore, the first two parts of the Om-
nicare rule, which is a direct descendant of the Fifth Circuit’s stance, would 
undoubtedly align with the undecided circuits.184 
Despite favoring the Fifth Circuit stance, uncertain circuits have left 
open the possibility that a special set of circumstances could make collec-
tive scienter appropriate.185 The third part of the Omnicare rule analyzes the 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See infra notes 194–215 and accompanying text. 
 180 See infra notes 216–228 and accompanying text. 
 181 See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig. (Omnicare II), 769 F.3d 455, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(“Given that neither approach is ideal, a middle ground is necessary.”); see also supra notes 87–
123 and accompanying text (introducing the split among circuits regarding corporate scienter). 
 182 See, e.g., Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 190 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs must establish facts creating an inference of scienter for each 
named defendant); Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2008) (re-
quiring that the plaintiff plead scienter with respect to the individuals who made the misstate-
ment); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 
(2d Cir. 2008) (reasoning that the most direct way to raise an inference of scienter is to plead it for 
an individual defendant); see also Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 
353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (adopting a standard for corporate scienter). 
 183 See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 
2008) (adopting the Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc. standard as a means to 
establish corporate liability); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 184 (4th Cir. 
2007) (citing Southland with approval in establishing the requisite scienter pleading standards); 
see also Glazer, 549 F.3d at 745 (requiring the plaintiffs to plead scienter with respect to the indi-
viduals who made the false statements in the merger agreement). 
 184 See Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 195 (declaring that when pleading scienter, “the most straight-
forward way to raise such an inference for a corporate defendant is to plead it for an individual 
defendant”); see also Bondi, supra note 6, at 6 (noting the long history of creating liability through 
respondeat superior in securities law). Compare Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (declaring the scien-
ter of the individual who uttered or participated in a misrepresentation as probative), with South-
land, 365 F.3d at 366 (examining scienter only in individuals who either make, contribute to, 
order, or approve a statement). 
 185 See Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 189 (concluding that a complaint can allege that at least 
one corporate agent acted with requisite scienter even if it does not specify that agent); Teamsters, 
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scienter of high managerial agents and directors and effectively codifies the 
dramatic false corporate announcement scenario the Seventh Circuit de-
scribed in 2008, in Makors Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (“Tellabs 
II”).186 Both the third part of the Omnicare rule and the Tellabs II scenario 
have the same underlying rationale: both suppose that certain corporate of-
ficers or directors must either approve or be sufficiently knowledgeable 
about the company to know that a statement is false.187 
For instance, a court applying the third part of the Omnicare rule to the 
hypothetical in Tellabs II would likely utilize similar empirical evidence and 
reach the same result.188 Returning to that hypothetical, if General Motors 
announced $1 million in sales when the number is in fact zero, it is very 
likely that a plaintiff could plead facts that a high managerial agent or cor-
porate director recklessly disregarded or tolerated such a misrepresenta-
tion.189 Such high managerial agents or directors likely encompass the same 
parties that the Tellabs II court suggested are “sufficiently knowledgeable” 
to recognize that such a statement is false.190 
Moreover, under the heighted level of specificity under the PSLRA, 
plaintiffs would still need to provide particularized facts regarding any reck-
less toleration or ratification by specific high managerial agents or direc-
tors.191 This would compensate for the “blanket assertions” or “raw data” 
pleadings rejected by circuits, and allow them to move toward a more flexi-
ble pleading standard. 192  The implementation of the Omnicare scienter 
                                                                                                                           
531 F.3d at 196 (concluding that Congress did not impose a rule that forbids establishing a strong 
inference of scienter without expressly naming an individual officer). 
 186 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (establishing a new rule to balance the competing inter-
ests of the PSLRA); Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710; see also supra notes 98–103 (describing the hy-
pothetical the court offered in Tellabs II as a situation where collective scienter could be applica-
ble). 
 187 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (extending the scienter analysis beyond those directly 
involved in the misrepresentation); Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710 (suggesting that in certain situations 
a broader form of scienter pleading could be appropriate). 
 188 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476; Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710 (holding that a plaintiff can-
not simply name management under the presumption that they approved a corporate statement). 
 189 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476; Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710. With facts related to the 
above scenario, such a pleading would “support a strong inference of scienter with respect to at 
least one authorized agent of the corporation,” thus satisfying the Fourth Circuit’s standard. See 
Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 189 (emphasis added) (quoting Teachers’ Ret., 477 F.3d at 184). 
190 See Tellabs II, 513 F.3d at 710 (posing a hypothetical that suggests a strong inference of 
scienter due to a corporate agent’s position).  
191 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring particularized facts giving rise to a 
strong inference of scienter); Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (declaring the scienter of any high 
managerial agent or member of the board of directors as probative for section 10(b) violations). 
 192 See In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 282 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[S]uch 
‘catch-all’ or ‘blanket’ assertions do not satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) and the 
PSLRA, and must be disregarded.”); see also Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 196 (“[Plaintiffs’] broad 
reference to raw data lacks even an allegation . . . .”); Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 
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pleading standard could potentially provide the desired pleading structure 
for circuits that have not foreclosed broader standards under the PSLRA.193 
B. High Managerial Agent 
Although the Omnicare test is a marked improvement over previous ap-
proaches to collective scienter, courts must further refine the test by providing 
a clearer standard for determining which “high managerial agents” can have 
their knowledge imputed to the corporation.194 By including “high managerial 
agent” among imputable employees to analyze when pleading scienter, the 
Omnicare II court left an ambiguity that could cause more disparity in judi-
cial interpretation.195  
As previously mentioned, the third part of the Omnicare rule was 
adopted from section 2.07 of the MPC.196 The MPC purportedly defines 
high managerial agent in relation to employees’ policymaking power; how-
ever, the language of this standard is problematically broad.197 This defini-
tion raises the question of who is considered to represent corporate poli-
cy.198 Moreover, the MPC fails to answer what policies of the corporation 
are relevant in analyzing managerial conduct.199 Cases involving CEOs and 
other top executives presumably fall easily within the category of high 
                                                                                                                           
353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a flexible analysis is appropriate in examining 
scienter pleadings). 
 193 See Glazer, 549 F.3d at 745 (deciding not to address the applicability of Tellabs II or col-
lective scienter due to the “limited nature” of the misstatements); see also City of Roseville Emps. 
Ret. Sys. v. Horizon Lines, Inc., 442 F. App’x 672, 676–77 (3d Cir. 2011) (deciding that the facts 
of the case would not allow the court to decide whether it agreed with a broader scienter ap-
proach). 
 194 See infra notes 196–215 and accompanying text (discussing the MPC definition for high 
managerial agent, which was adopted by the Omnicare II court). 
 195 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476 (allowing plaintiffs to plead the scienter of any high mana-
gerial agent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (“[T]here is 
no rigid test to determine whether an agent is a ‘managerial agent.’”). 
 196 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962); supra notes 153–154 and 
accompanying text (discussing the third part of the Omnicare rule). 
 197 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c); Green, supra note 154, at 205 (concluding that the 
Model Penal Code (“MPC”) measures the term high managerial agent in terms of policymaking.); 
see Stern, supra note 33, at 136 (arguing that a high managerial agent standard does not provide 
any definitive manner to distinguish who actually takes part in policymaking). 
 198 See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (1991) (offering a scenario in which a purchasing agent 
could be considered a high managerial agent, and thus attaching liability to a corporation); George 
R. Skupski, Note, The Senior Management Mens Rea: Another Stab at a Workable Integration of 
Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CASE W. L. REV. 263, 270 
(2011) (describing flaws with the MPC corporate liability model). 
 199 See Lipton, supra note 31, at 1291 (stating that the breadth of the high managerial agent 
standard often implicates any agent who holds a supervisory role); Stern, supra note 33, at 135–36 
(discussing the ambiguities of the MPC’s high managerial agent definition). 
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managerial policymakers.200 But, this categorization becomes far less clear 
in a public corporation with many managerial agents who have a lesser abil-
ity to implement corporate policy.201 This issue is only exacerbated in large 
corporations and could broaden the scope of corporate liability beyond Om-
nicare II’s intentions.202 Without a definitive high managerial agent rule, an 
officer or director planning to make a public statement would theoretically 
have to survey all managerial agents believed to be imputable under Om-
nicare II to ensure the statement’s validity.203 This would be unduly burden-
some and prohibitively expensive.204  
Therefore, a high managerial agent for determining corporate scienter 
should be explicitly limited to executive officers.205 The best definition of 
what constitutes an executive officer is found in section 16(a) of the Ex-
change Act.206 The SEC defines the term officer as referring to:  
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 476–77 (reasoning that a CEO’s knowledge is imputed to the 
corporation under the formulation of the standard). It is doubtless that any C-level executive of a 
corporation would be considered an “officer” of the corporation with the ability to implement 
policy. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (defining high managerial agent); supra notes 153–
154 and accompanying text (discussing the third part of the Omnicare rule). 
 201 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 14 n.51 (stating that large corporations could have a large 
number of management-level employees, which would overly broaden corporate exposure). For 
example, federal district courts in the Second Circuit have already extended this label beyond 
executive officers with no means of differentiating an imputable managerial agent. See In re 
Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 452, 481–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (imput-
ing the knowledge of a senior vice president and a division head, but recognizing there is no sim-
ple formula for how senior an employee must be in order to be imputable); In re BISYS Sec. 
Litig., 397 F. Supp. 2d 430, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (imputing scienter of regional vice president and 
vice president of corporate finance). 
 202 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477 (discussing how the court’s rule is designed to prevent 
strike suits by limiting the corporate agents that can be examined); see also Bondi, supra note 6, at 
14 n.51 (discussing how a corporation’s size can unintentionally broaden the scope of a purported-
ly limited version of collective scienter); O’Riordan, supra note 7, at 1621–22 (analyzing the issue 
of drawing the line with hybrid collective scienter). For example, Omnicare industry competitor 
CardinalHealth employs over 36,000 people worldwide with possibly thousands of managerial 
agents who implement various corporate policies. See Our People, CARDINALHEALTH, http://
www.cardinalhealth.com/en/about-us/our-people.html [http:// perma.cc/8HB3-FWVQ]. 
 203 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing the practical shortcomings of strong and hybrid 
collective scienter); Jeffries, supra note 21, at 543 (discussing criticism over broad collective 
scienter and corporate compliance). 
 204 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 25 (“Identifying the person or persons with knowledge can be 
enormously costly and . . . may be akin to finding a needle in a haystack.”); Maslo, supra note 32, 
at 98–99 (describing the undue amounts of human resources and money that would be required to 
check all communications with investors). The fact-checking with an ambiguous high managerial 
standard becomes even more of an issue with transnational corporations. See O’Riordan, supra 
note 7, at 1623 (noting how compliance issues amplify in the case of large international corpora-
tions). 
 205 See infra notes 206–215 and accompanying text (arguing how limiting the inquiry to exec-
utive officers under the Exchange Act’s “officer” definition better serves the Omnicare test). 
 206 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2015). Section 16(a) requires 
corporate insiders such as directors, officers, and ten percent security holders to file periodic re-
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[A] president, principal financial officer, principal accounting of-
ficer (or, if there is no such accounting officer, the controller), any 
vice-president . . . in charge of a principal business unit, division 
or function (such as sales, administration or finance) . . . or any 
other person who performs similar policy-making functions for 
the issuer.207 
This definition also applies to any officers of subsidiaries that perform simi-
lar policy-making functions for the company. 208 Although this definition 
similarly refers to policymaking power, section 16(a) of the Exchange Act 
provides a further distinction that “policy-making function” is intended to 
apply to significant corporate policies.209 
Courts should adopt the officer standard from section 16(a) of the Ex-
change Act because, instead of broadly looking to employees who can be 
“fairly assume[d] to represent the policy of the corporation,” this standard 
will look to employees that specifically have the power to implement and 
execute major corporate policy. 210  Establishing more definitive, yet still 
flexible, criteria will prevent courts from casting too wide a net over agents 
who can be found to represent corporate policy.211 
Adopting this definition of high managerial agents will additionally 
provide clear compliance guidance for corporations, and incentivize execu-
tives to rectify any statements they know to be false or misleading.212 Hav-
ing an executive status comes with the increased responsibility of safe-
                                                                                                                           
ports regarding their beneficial stock ownership. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1); see also Arnold S. 
Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
209, 210 (1987) (providing an overview of section 16(a) of the Exchange Act). 
 207 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f). Although the SEC has regulations defining an “executive of-
ficer,” the officer definition is more detailed and provides essentially the same agents for consid-
eration. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (“The term executive officer . . . means its president, any vice 
president of the registrant in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, 
administration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy making function or any other 
person who performs similar policy making functions for the registrant.”). 
 208 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f). 
 209 See id. (“‘Policy-making function’ is not intended to include policy-making functions that 
are not significant.”). 
 210 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c). 
 211 See Bucy, supra note 198, at 1105 (describing a case extending liability beyond an execu-
tive policymaker to a purchasing agent); Stern, supra note 33, at 135 (arguing that the MPC’s 
standard is too flexible in allowing courts to determine whose acts represent the corporation’s 
policies). As an added benefit, courts will be able to use corporate filings with the SEC as a tool 
because such filings require companies to adhere to the same executive officer criteria. See Pugh 
v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that an indi-
vidual was a senior-level officer because he was not included in the company’s SEC filing). 
 212 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477 (holding that the court’s rule is designed to prevent man-
agement from insulating themselves from false or misleading statements); Abril & Olazábal, su-
pra note 7, at 142 (asserting that those who authorize, request, or command public statements 
should ultimately bear some responsibility for them). 
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guarding corporate compliance, and this formulation of the rule will reflect 
that burden.213 Moreover, limiting high managerial agents to executive of-
ficers properly balances the fundamental purposes of the PSLRA.214 It al-
lows corporations to implement efficient compliance programs, and ensures 
candid disclosure by those most accountable for corporate operations.215 
C. Broader Standards Are Inadequate 
Opponents to this altered Omnicare rule may argue that courts should 
adopt a broader standard because plaintiffs serve an important regulating 
function in keeping corporate disclosure honest.216 This argument, however, 
is outweighed by the negative impact that meritless suits have on investor 
confidence.217 In light of recent financial instability, plaintiffs are seeking 
out financially secure defendants in the hopes of a securing a generous set-
tlement, regardless of how attenuated the defendants’ role was in the alleged 
fraudulent actions.218 This exacerbates financial hardships for shareholders 
and creates additional social costs. 219 Also, there are other mechanisms, 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See Frances Floriano Goins, Defending Clients from Securities Fraud Claims, in RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW 17, 17 (2013 ed.), 2013 WL 5290488 (discussing new “top–
down” guidelines issued by legislators and prosecutors to increase oversight and responsibility of 
directors and senior corporate management); Lipton, supra note 31, at 1267 (asserting that without 
liability, top officers and corporate managers will be incentivized to tacitly encourage fraudulent 
behavior). 
 214 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477 (applying its rule against the competing interests of the 
PSLRA); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (stating that meritless strike suits undermine the fundamental purpose of 
securities laws); Jeffries, supra note 21, at 534 (discussing the need to balance the objectives of the 
PSLRA). 
 215 See Bondi, supra note 6, at 28 (discussing how collective scienter would make corporate 
counseling and compliance unpredictable); Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Execu-
tives “Naked, Homeless, and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the 
Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2007) (argu-
ing for equitable remedies against executives engaging in corporate fraud or misreporting).  
 216 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31  (noting the importance of private securities litigation to 
the integrity of the American market); Jeffries, supra note 21, at 533 (suggesting that the ability of 
the SEC and private plaintiffs to hold companies accountable is important in supporting market 
integrity and investor confidence). 
 217 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (“[T]he investing public and entire U.S. economy 
have been injured by the unwillingness of the best qualified person to serve on the boards of direc-
tors and of issuers to discuss publicly their future prospects, because of fear of baseless and extor-
tionate securities lawsuits.”); see also Lipton, supra note 31, at 1265 (highlighting the policy ben-
efits that come with corporate disclosure). 
 218 See Goins, supra note 213, at 32 (“Many of these deep-pocket defendants are only periph-
eral players, at best, in the activities giving rise to the fraud claims.”). 
 219 See MUKESH BAJAJ ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES: THE REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 17 (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/EconomicConsequences_Web.pdf [http://perma.
cc/V2NX-MW3C] (citing studies reporting that shareholders lose $39 billion annually when secu-
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such as legislation, that can better serve the deterrence, restitution, and in-
vestor confidence goals of securities laws.220 
The altered Omnicare rule does not foreclose the possibility of mem-
bers of middle or lower management having knowledge imputed to plead 
scienter.221 The first two parts of the rule, comparable to the Fifth Circuit’s 
ruling in Southland, would impute scienter to any employee involved in any 
way with a misstatement.222 In this way, the scope of the Omnicare test de-
pends entirely on what facts the plaintiff can allege, making it a natural fit 
for the fact-based nature of securities fraud claims; if plaintiffs can allege 
facts indicating that middle or lower management were involved in the mis-
statement, the Omnicare test would allow such a claim to go forward.223 
Conversely, proponents of a traditional agency law approach may ar-
gue that this rule will result in more litigation where plaintiffs allege that 
executives ratified fraudulent conduct ex post facto.224 Pleading under the 
PSLRA requires particularized facts to establish scienter.225 Many courts 
that have been open to broader forms of pleading have nonetheless dis-
                                                                                                                           
rities lawsuits are announced); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (discussing the negative 
effects of meritless litigation). 
 220 See Jeffries, supra note 21, at 532–33 (stating that the ability of private litigants and the 
SEC to pursue securities violations serves to promote deterrence, compensation of victims, and 
investor confidence); Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the 
SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 394 (2015) (discussing how the SEC’s fair 
funds distributions are effectively compensating victims without securities class actions). 
 221 See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 477 (“Under our formation of the rule, a corporation is not 
insulated if lower-level employees, contributing to the misstatement, knowingly provide false 
information . . . with the intent to defraud the public.”). 
 222 See id. at 476 (presenting a three-part rule incorporating a Southland-like standard); South-
land, 365 F.3d at 366 (holding that the scienter of the individuals that make and prepare the state-
ments is analyzed for section 10(b) actions). 
 223 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (“A complaint 
will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”); J. Michael 
Marcoux, Canaries in the Coal Mine: Facts from Securities Fraud Private Civil Actions Can 
Identify Intent to Manipulate Energy Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 141, 150–51 (2008) (illustrating 
how some facts can support scienter while other facts are insufficient). 
 224 See Pugh, 521 F.3d at 700–01 (holding it insufficient that plaintiffs allege that a defendant 
had knowledge simply because of his position in the company); Suprema Specialties, 438 F.3d at 
281–82 (concluding that the bare inference of a defendant’s position in a company is not enough 
to support scienter). It may also be argued that this formulation of scienter pleading will lead to 
excessive costs in director and officer insurance rates. See Teamsters Amici Curiae, supra note 68, 
at 28 (arguing that the cost of directors and officers liability insurance—D&O insurance—is six 
times higher in the United States than in Europe). 
 225 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he complaint shall . . . state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”). In 
Omnicare II, despite alleging that certain employees who fit within the court’s new test had the 
requisite scienter, the plaintiffs’ complaint nevertheless failed because they did not allege particu-
larized facts. See Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 484; Foley et al., supra note 157, at 2 (summarizing 
how the plaintiffs were not able to meet the pleading requirements of the PSLRA).  
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missed cases based on the strength of the facts alleged.226 Courts open to a 
scenario where a plaintiff need not plead individual scienter have still re-
quired specificity as to the knowledge and intent of an individual agent dur-
ing the time of the alleged fraud.227 If anything, this formulation of scienter 
pleading will prevent establishing a strong inference merely from an agent’s 
position in the corporation.228 
CONCLUSION 
In 2014, in In re Omnicare, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Omnicare II”), 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit established an effective 
standard to address the circuit split over collective scienter. The ruling 
adopted the narrow respondeat superior approach from the Fifth Circuit, 
combined with a narrowed version of what could be construed as a pure 
collective scienter approach. The flexibility in this bipartisan approach 
makes the Omnicare II ruling appealing for circuits that have not fully 
committed to an existing scienter approach. The rule, however, must pro-
vide an explicit definition of a “high managerial agent” to prevent judicial 
interpretation from extending the scope of the rule toward an overly broad 
pure collective scienter approach. A pleading standard broader than Om-
nicare II would only instigate meritless litigation every time stocks depreci-
ate, and would create disincentives for corporations to disclose information. 
This would be contrary to the fundamental purposes of both the Exchange 
Act and the PSLRA. With a well-defined executive officer standard, the 
Omnicare II ruling will provide clear guidance for federal compliance. 
These clear standards, along with the narrowed Omnicare II rule, will en-
courage corporations to publicly disclose information to investors. 
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 226 See, e.g., Omnicare II, 769 F.3d at 484 (“Accordingly, each of these factors cuts against 
finding an inference of scienter—let alone, a strong one . . . .”); Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 196 
(“[Plaintiff’s] broad reference to raw data lacks even an allegation . . . . Accordingly, they have 
not raised an inference of scienter . . . .”). 
 227 See Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 190 (“[T]o the extent a plaintiff alleges fraud claims against 
individual defendants, the plaintiff must allege facts supporting a strong inference of scienter as to 
each defendant.”); S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring addi-
tional facts on top of a “core operations” inference regarding the officer’s knowledge of fraud). 
 228 See supra notes 194–215 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of heightened 
specificity requirements). 
 
 
 
 
